Goldman's sweep for internal emails containing client insults
like "muppet," a scoop by my Reuters colleague Lauren LaCapra,
got lots of well-deserved snark as the bank's latest
too-little-too-late response to Greg Smith's "Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs" op-ed. In case you're just returning from a
vacation in Antarctica, which is pretty much the only way you
could have avoided the financial world's equivalent of Kim
Kardashian's divorce, Smith, a London-based Goldman executive
director, said he was sick and tired of the bank's callous
treatment of its clients. "It's purely about how we can make the
most possible money off of them," Smith wrote in the New York
Times. "If you were an alien from Mars and sat in on one of
these meetings, you would believe that a client's success or
progress was not part of the thought process at all."
Why Smith's piece was considered a revelation is mystifying,
given Goldman's starring role in last April's 635-page Senate report on Wall Street and the financial crisis. We all know
about the Securities and Exchange Commission scrutiny of the
Abacus deal, in which Goldman permitted hedge fund manager John
Paulson to pick underlying mortgages that doomed the
collateralized debt obligation it was hawking to clients, and
the famous "one shitty deal" otherwise known as the Timberwolf mortgage-backed CDO. As the Senate report explains, both were
part of Goldman's institutional effort to secretly reverse its
own long position in residential mortgage-backed securities even
as it marketed MBS investments to clients.
That's the campaign U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero of
federal court in Manhattan detailed in a 64-page ruling Wednesday that greenlights most securities and common law fraud
claims by investors in two other rigged-to-fail CDOs, Hudson 1
and Hudson 2. (Here's Jon Stempel's Reuters story on the ruling.) Marrero's decision doesn't have the freewheeling
rhetorical flair (or 1980s pop references) of Delaware
Chancellor Leo Strine's much-discussed opinion on Goldman's conflicts in Kinder Morgan's proposed acquisition of El Paso Corporation, but in a way it's a much more devastating ruling.
Marrero portrays a sweeping, months-long effort, initiated by
Goldman CFO David Viniar, to shed the bank's exposure to
subprime mortgages in mortgage-backed securities -- and
simultaneously to take advantage of clients who were slower to
perceive the looming MBS market collapse.
As I read through Marrero's decision, I kept thinking of the
movie Margin Call, in which Kevin Spacey suffers a crisis of
conscience as he oversees a sell-off of his bank's MBS
portfolio, at the expense of the clients buying the securities.
Goldman, like the unnamed investment bank in the movie, came to
a sudden realization that it had to shed MBS exposure. But its
bankers were much smarter than their counterparts in Margin
Call. They didn't just sell off their portfolio, according to
the Marrero ruling. They created doomed CDOs, hedged against the
(inevitable) failure of their own instruments, and gladly
accepted fees from the clients they allegedly duped into buying
the securities. It was a breathtakingly brilliant campaign, if
you're of a ruthless bent. Goldman's secret MBS short, as
Marrero depicts it, tricked not just its own clients but the
entire MBS marketplace.
I should note here that Marrero's ruling is preliminary. To
decide whether to dismiss the case at this stage, the judge must
assume all of the allegations in the Hudson investors' complaint
are true. (The investors, represented by Berger & Montague,
relied heavily on evidence from the Senate subcommittee report.)
There hasn't been additional discovery in the Hudson case, and
Goldman's lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell have argued that the
bank fully disclosed its hedge against the CDO to the
sophisticated investors who purchased Hudson instruments; other
federal judges who've considered securities fraud class actions
based on similar allegations regarding other controversial
Goldman CDOs have agreed with the bank's argument. (Goldman
declined a Reuters request to comment on the ruling.)
With those caveats, Marrero portrays a scheme he describes
as "not only reckless, but bordering on cynical." As early as
2005, he said, Goldman began to understand through its own
underwriting and its relationship with the outside mortgage
appraiser Clayton Holdings that mortgage lending standards were
deteriorating. Goldman Sachs had bet heavily on the continued
success of mortgage-backed securities, and by the summer of
2006, knew that was a bad bet. The problem, according to the
co-manager of the bank's structured products unit (quotes in
Marrero's ruling), was that there were "few opportunities" to
shed Goldman's MBS risk. The market believed the bank was "very
long for the foreseeable future," according to another Goldman
official Marrero cited.
Nevertheless, in December 2006, CFO Viniar directed the
structured finance group to begin aggressively ridding the bank
of subprime risk and positioning Goldman to take advantage of
"very good opportunities as the market goes into what is likely
to be even greater distress." Thus was born the program of
shorting Goldman-devised (and Goldman-sold) CDOs based on
mortgage-backed securities. The program was so successful that
according to filings Marrero cited, Goldman had a net short
position of $2.1 billion in credit default swaps on
mortgage-backed instruments by March 2007. By August 2007,
Goldman told the SEC, it had reduced its overall exposure to
subprime mortgage backed securities from $7.2 billion to $2.4
billion. Through what Marrero called "the fine art of financial
transubstantiation," Goldman (in the words of one of its
bankers) managed "to make some lemonade from some big old
lemons."
The Hudson CDO offerings came smack in the middle of
Goldman's risk reduction campaign, context that was crucial to
Marrero's decision not to dismiss most of the investors' case.
Goldman's own actions -- "selecting the referenced (residential)
MBS and then betting heavily against them" -- indicated to
Marrero that the bank well understood the risks of its subprime
exposure and "maneuvered" to offload it. "All Goldman needed for
the success of its venture was large 'sophisticated' investors
(to) drink up the bittersweet potion despite Goldman's
boilerplate warnings," the judge wrote. "Goldman thus managed to
shift its significant subprime risk over to its own clients."
That's muppeteering on a whole different level.
(Reporting by Alison Frankel)
Follow Alison on Twitter: @AlisonFrankel
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