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In Nike opinion, justices reaffirm limits on who has the right to sue

1/10/2013 COMMENTS (0)

Though it surely doesn't have the national significance of last year's eye-of-the-needle opinion upholding Obamacare, one of the most famous pieces of writing by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts is his dissent in a 2008 case called Sprint Communications v. APCC Services. The dissent is notorious because Roberts quoted Bob Dylan -- "When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose" -- in what Adam Liptak of The New York Times reported to be "almost certainly the first use of a rock lyric to buttress a legal proposition in a Supreme Court decision." The subject of Roberts's dissent in Sprint -- Article III standing to sue -- isn't as much fun as his Dylan citation, but standing has been a concern of the chief justice since before he was named to the court. So it wasn't a surprise that Roberts wrote Wednesday's unanimous Supreme Court opinion in Already v. Nike. And given the chief justice's previous endorsement of the Bob Dylan theory of Article III standing, the outcome of the case isn't a shocker either.

The Nike ruling shoots down what Roberts called a "boundless" rethinking of standing, in which "a market participant is injured for Article III purposes whenever a competitor benefits from something allegedly unlawful -- whether a trademark, the awarding of a contract, a landlord-tenant arrangement, or so on." Speculative future harm doesn't constitute enough of an injury to support standing, Roberts said, refuting the policy argument by Already -- a boutique sneaker manufacturer -- that small companies should have leeway to sue as protection against big competitors attempting to bully them through litigation. That redefinition of standing, Roberts said, could easily backfire on small businesses. "Lowering the gates for one party lowers the gates for all," including big competitors, he wrote.

To get to the standing question, the court first had to decide whether Nike signed away all of its future rights to sue Already for infringing its trademark through a covenant not to sue -- and which side bore the burden of proving the scope of the covenant. As we've previously reported, the dispute in this case specifically involved Nike's trademark on its incredibly popular Air Force sneakers. Nike sued Already, which makes sneakers under the name of Yums, for infringing its Air Force mark. But after Already filed a counterclaim challenging the validity of the mark, Nike offered Already a covenant not to sue, in which it agreed not to bring claims against Already for any past or present Yums shoes or future Yums shoes that closely resembled those already produced. Already signed the covenant but sought to continue litigating its counterclaim; Nike (and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals) said the covenant effectively ended federal court jurisdiction over the case.

The Supreme Court held that Nike and other defendants cannot automatically moot cases against them by ending their supposedly illegal conduct. "Otherwise," Roberts wrote, "a defendant could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends." By extension, the court said, Nike bears the "formidable burden" of showing that the covenant in this case foreclosed any reasonable expectation that it could resume its infringement litigation against Already. (That point was buttressed in a concurrence by four justices, who emphasized that covenants not to sue don't automatically let wrongdoers off the hook for counterclaims.) The court's affirmation of what's known as the "voluntary cessation doctrine" was a win for Already, which had argued that counterclaim defendants must prove that they're precluded from resuming wrongful behavior.

But Roberts's opinion went on to conclude that Nike's covenant cut off any such prospect, since Already could not possibly produce a sneaker that would infringe Nike's mark yet fall outside of the covenant not to sue. "If such a shoe exists, the parties have not pointed to it, there is no evidence that Already has dreamt of it, and we cannot conceive of it," Roberts wrote. "It sits, as far as we can tell, on a shelf between Dorothy's ruby slippers and Perseus's winged sandals."

That finding meant that Already could only attain standing in federal court on the theoretical grounds that it is harmed by uncertainty over the validity of Nike's mark -- an argument Roberts and the rest of the court roundly rejected. Interestingly, the court's opinion does not address whether Already would have standing if it challenged Nike's trademark through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and received an adverse ruling. We'll have to wait and see whether this ruling is cited the next time a trademark challenger asks the Federal Circuit to review a PTO decision upholding a mark.

So, can Already now make its own version of Nike's Air Force shoes, since the Supreme Court has said there's no way Nike can sue for infringement of its mark? Roberts addressed the possibility in a footnote. An exact replica of Nike's shoe, he said, would presumably include Nike's famous swoosh, which is trademarked independently and isn't subject to the covenant. Nike could cite infringement of the swoosh mark even if it's precluded from suing over the Air Force trademark.

Both Nike counsel Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Russell and Already counsel James Dabney of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson declined comment on the ruling.

(Reporting by Alison Frankel)

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