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A humpback whale of the coast of Mazatlan. REUTERS Stringer Mexico

Breakingviews: U.S. companies can do good without new legal fad

1/31/2012 COMMENTS (1)

NEW YORK, Jan 31 (Reuters Breakingviews) - U.S. companies can do plenty of good without the latest legal fad. So-called benefit corporations allow boards to establish social goals alongside the profit motive and, at least theoretically, avoid lawsuits over lagging stock prices. But directors can already use their business judgment to justify activities like saving the whales.

The idea is that investors who share a company's stated non-financial aims could buy stock and then judge the firm's performance according to standards set by third parties. Plenty of private companies have signed on. Outdoor-apparel firm Patagonia, for example, became a California benefit corporation on the first possible day in January. No public company has yet switched, in part because it would require a shareholder vote.

The new structure was dreamed up in 2009 by a Philadelphia lawyer whose client, B Lab, wanted a bigger market for its system of rating how well companies meet social and environmental objectives. In addition to California, New York and five others states have passed laws allowing companies to give those goals priority.

Another part of the rationale is that a corporate charter specifying social responsibility as a goal might shield a company from stock-drop lawsuits, which typically focus narrowly on shareholder value. But this is where the argument for benefit corporations gets weak.

The business judgment rule in U.S. corporate law generally protects boards that believe they are acting in a company's best interests, making all sorts of environmental and community activities justifiable. And except for certain situations when a company is sold, there's no legal duty to maximize share value. So directors can already do good deeds without much fear of being sued successfully. What's more, nothing stops regular companies from specifying social goals in their certificates of incorporation.

Even publicly minded shareholders, though, want decent returns. Otherwise, they could just contribute to charity. Benefit corporations may severely limit their appeal by giving investors few options for asserting their financial interests. There's plenty of room for socially responsible corporate behavior under current law. That makes benefit corporations look like a solution in search of a problem.

 

CONTEXT NEWS

-- California's law allowing so-called benefit corporations went into force on Jan. 1, and New York's will become effective on Feb. 10.

-- The two major U.S. states are among seven that have enacted laws allowing for-profit companies to adopt a new legal structure that lets boards of directors stress objectives. The laws are designed to protect companies from investor lawsuits that target lagging stock prices without reference to other activities.

-- Maryland was the first state to adopt such a law, on Oct. 1, 2010. It has since been followed by New Jersey, California, New York and three other states. Four more states have introduced bills that have not yet passed.social or environmental goals alongside financial

(Reporting by Reynolds Holding, a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

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Comments (1)

2/2/2012 9:29:46 AM by agreenblatt

I write as a social entrepreneur, Professor at NYU who teaches on the subject, a lawyer, and a big fan of the new corporate form discussed in this article, Benefit Corporations. I fear the author overstates the freedom current corporations have and misses crucial features of the new laws. First, the author seems to believe that corporations under the existing business judgment rule can pretty much do as they please. The courts have been clear that officers and directors do have wide latitude in the WAY they pursue creating maximum shareholder value, but not WHETHER they must pursue creating maximum shareholder value. I know of no case law in which officers prevailed after admitting that they had taken actions they knew would reduce profits but did it for some other social good. Every company needs to make a profit, but not every company should be required to maximize profit. As pointed out in the article, even these freedoms granted under the business judgment rule are severely curtailed in exit scenarios when a corporation with a social mission is faced with two offers, one from a higher bidder who will ignore the social mission and a lower one who will maintain it. Benefit Corporations protect directors and officers making decisions in both of these situations. Second, the article ignores the important protections afforded social investors by the new Benefit Corporation statutes. Under traditional law, officers and directors cannot be compelled to create a social benefit, especially if doing so would reduce shareholder value. Investors drawn to a corporation because of its officers’ professed aim to create some social benefit have no way to hold them accountable if the officer later abandons that pursuit in order to maximize shareholder value. This growing segment of the investor world is seeking to have their money have more impact than simply financial returns and they need these protections if they are going to put their money into these endeavors. Furthermore, Benefit Corporations offer far greater transparency, something efficient markets need to thrive. This transparency comes in many ways including making it clear to potential investors that they are investing in a corporation with a different fiduciary duty, having Benefit Corporations issue annual reports about their pursuit of public benefit, and having these corporations use an independent third party standard to evaluate their progress. Traditional corporations offer the social investor market none of these benefits. No, Benefit Corporations are not a passing fad. They are a vital new tool for social investors and social entrepreneurs, and an important evolution in the history of corporate law.


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