The relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals reminds me of a parent with a
recalcitrant teenager. Faced with, say, confusion over patent eligibility -- the legal equivalent of a messy room -- the
Supreme Court tells the Federal Circuit that it won't tolerate
such slovenliness. The appeals court mutters, "You're not the
boss of me," and slams its door, leaving those empty yet still
greasy pizza boxes exactly where they were.
In a case it agreed to hear on Friday, the high court will
once again have the chance to discipline the Federal Circuit,
this time on the question of federal-court jurisdiction over
state-law legal malpractice claims involving patents. The case,
Gunn v. Minton, gives the Supreme Court a chance to decide
whether the Federal Circuit -- in deciding that federal court is
the appropriate forum for legal malpractice suits arising from
patent cases -- misinterpreted the test for federal jurisdiction
that the Supreme Court established in its 2005 decision in
Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering.
The background of Gunn v. Minton is a bit twisty, but here's
a condensed version. Minton is a former broker and inventor who
developed software that permits investors to trade over a public
telecom system. In 1995, he licensed the software to a NASDAQ
brokerage before receiving NASDAQ approval for it -- and before
patenting his technology. More than a year later, Minton applied
for a patent, which he was awarded in 2000. He then filed a $100
million infringement suit against NASDAQ. Minton's case was
tossed under the Patent Act's "on-sale bar," which holds that a
patent is invalid when the invention it covers was sold more
than a year before the inventor filed a patent application.
Minton subsequently sued the lawyers who represented him in the
NASDAQ case, claiming that they committed malpractice when they
failed to raise arguments that the on-sale bar doesn't
invalidate his claim because he sold the software for
experimental use.
Minton brought the malpractice case in Texas state court.
The trial judge dismissed it, finding no evidence that Minton
licensed his software on an experimental basis. Minton appealed
to the state appellate court in Fort Worth. While that appeal
was under way, the Federal Circuit ruled in two cases -- Air Measurement v. Akin Gump and Immunocept v. Fulbright -- that
when a state-law malpractice case arises from a substantive
issue of patent law, federal courts have jurisdiction.
Based on that precedent, Minton asked the state appeals
court to dismiss his case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, which would allow him to refile his claims in
federal court. The state appeals court refused and instead
affirmed the lower court's finding that Minton had no case. But
when Minton appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, the majority of a divided court held that Minton was right: Under the U.S.
Supreme Court's Grable test, as interpreted by the Federal
Circuit in Air Measurement and Immunocept, Minton's malpractice
case belonged in federal court.
"The federal patent issue presented here is necessary,
disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying
state legal malpractice lawsuit," the Texas Supreme Court
majority said in a 5-to-3 decision in December 2011.
"Additionally, the patent issue may be determined without
creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal
courts. We conclude that exclusive federal jurisdiction exists
in this case." (After that ruling, Minton refiled his
malpractice suit in federal court in Tyler, Texas.)
Minton's former lawyers, represented by Jane Webre of Scott,
Douglass & McConnico, filed a petition for Supreme Court review,
arguing that the Federal Circuit had claimed jurisdiction over
an improperly large swath of cases with embedded patent issues,
without sufficient regard for state interests. "The Federal
Circuit's overbroad determination of federal court jurisdiction
has far-reaching consequences for the balance between state and
federal courts' jurisdiction over legal malpractice cases, which
are -- and have always been -- a creature of state law and
involve important standards of attorney conduct," Webre wrote,
asserting that the appeals court's interpretation of embedded
federal questions could lead other federal courts to usurp state
jurisdiction. She conceded that the Supreme Court has twice
refused to address the disparity between its ruling in Grable
and the Federal Circuit's interpretation of that ruling in Air
Measurement and Immunocept, but said those refusals only showed
that this remains "an important and recurring problem."
"The Federal Circuit's construct of 'arising under
jurisdiction' -- which the Texas Supreme Court followed in our
case -- inappropriately sweeps all manner of state law cases
into federal court," Webre told me in an email
comment. "Fundamentally, it upsets the balance between state and
federal courts, which is something that the (Supreme Court) has
carefully defended in its 'arising under' cases."
Minton's appellate counsel, Thomas Michel of Griffith, Jay &
Michel, countered in his opposition to the petition for certiorari that the Texas Supreme Court had properly weighed the
Grable factors when it determined federal-court jurisdiction. He
also argued that the cert petition posited a "sky is falling"
impact from the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional holding when no
such hysteria is warranted. "(Minton's former) attorneys have no
support for such an argument," Michel wrote. "There is no
empirical data to support their argument that the decisions in
Air Measurement and Immunocept have opened the floodgates to
allow all sorts of embedded federal question cases into federal
courts."
"The Federal Circuit applied the correct analysis in
interpreting Grable," Michel told me Monday. "The Texas Supreme
Court did as well."
Nevertheless, with its cert grant, the Supreme Court has
once again elected to play parent to the Federal Circuit,
deciding whether the appeals court is busting curfew.
(Reporting by Alison Frankel)
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